

Integration of Biological Incident Response plans with Emergency Management at the Idaho National Laboratory

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- Many facilities consider laboratory biohazard emergencies and exposures, but procedures may not be well-integrated with institution-wide emergency plans and staff
- Facilities possessing, using, or transferring select agents were required to prepare, exercise, and revise incident response plans annually after March 2005



- Incidents involving select agents may result from release, loss, or theft
- Incidents may require responses from program staff, first responders, facility ERO, physical security/law enforcement, and public health agencies
- CDC and USDA/APHIS have federal authority and require immediate notification

09-11-01
YOU CAN NOT STOP US.
WE HAVE THIS ANTHRAX.
YOU DIE NOW.
ARE YOU AFRAID?
DEATH TO AMERICA.
DEATH TO ISRAEL.
ALLAH IS GREAT.



Emergency Planning and Biosafety

Regulations

- 42 CFR 73
- 10 CFR 851
(DOE N 450.7
now part of 851)
- DOE O 151.1C
- DOT 49 CFR
171-3, 175 -
shipping)
- 29 CFR
1910.1030
(BBP)

Facility

Procedures

Other

- CDC Biosafety
in
Microbiological
and Biomedical
Labs (BMBL –
5th Edition)
- NIH Guidelines
for recombinant
DNA research

Stakeholders

- Facility
personnel,
community
- Public health
(local-federal)
- Law
enforcement
(local-federal)
- Agriculture
(local-
federal)



- 42 CFR 73.14b also requires that an incident response plan “fully describe response procedures for theft, loss, or release...severe weather and other natural disasters, workplace violence, bomb threats, suspicious packages, and emergencies such as fire, gas leak, explosion, power outage, etc.” and “*must be coordinated with any entity-wide plans, kept in the workplace, and available to employees for review.*”



- 42 CFR 73.14c(5-12) also requires the plan describe personnel roles and lines of authority and communication, *planning and coordination with local emergency responders*, procedures for employees performing rescue or medical duties, emergency medical treatment and first aid, list of personal protective and emergency equipment and their locations, *site security and control*, procedures for emergency evacuation, and decontamination procedures.



- **Single scenario involving explosion from adjacent lab impacting live biological agents**
- **Participants included lab staff, facility engineers, first responders, management, emergency management, and public health**
- **Two table top drills activating EOC**
- **1 exercise with limited local responder participation (haz-mat team and law enforcement did not participate); evacuations and decon were not carried out**



- **NARAC and VIZ models indicated rapid dispersal and movement of agent with prevailing winds**
- **Incident commander wants rapid access to information on need for evacuation around release, quarantine, decontamination**
- **First responders need access to facility HVAC controls (remote control desirable); access to select agent labs**
- **Separate evacuation zones may be necessary for potentially contaminated/exposed personnel – similar to evacuation from rad areas; also may be special needs for transport to hospital**
- **Biological contamination surveys may be desirable, and should be planned for**



- **Containment/inactivation by lab staff if possible**
- **If lab exhaust is recirculated or unfiltered (HEPA), HVAC shutdown may be desirable**
- **Building evacuation should be considered if there is potential for release outside lab**
- **Awareness of biohazards and training with first responders**
- **Lab staff need to train in emergency procedures**

EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED



EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ROUNDUP

EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED



**Thanks to INL Emergency Management
for all their help!**

